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Leading Economic Indicators
Movements in the Index of Leading Economic
Indicators (Ill), compiled by the Department of
Commerce, typically garner front-page attention.
Every wiggle is analyzed by government and
business economists for signals about the future
health of the economy with good reason. Each
post-war business cycle peak (and trough) has
been preceded by a significant decline (and rise)
in the ILl. The current recovery is no exception:
eight months prior to the beginning ofthe
upswing in December 1982, the indexof leading
economic indicators began to rise.
"Noise" and news
There are, however, at least two difficulties with
using the index as a forecasting aid. The first is
that, except with the benefit of sufficiently long
hindsight, it is often difficultto judge at the time it
occurs whether an upturn or downturn in the
index will be sustained. The index often exhibits
short-term swings that are soon reversed. Since
May 1984, for example, the III has changed
direction six times. To filter outthis "noise" in the
numbers, analysts often apply rules-of-thumb. A
common rule is that a change in the direction of
the index lasting at least three consecutive
months constitutes a signal of recession or
recovery to come. On this basis, initial estimates
of the index in 1984 signalled a recession -they
declined in June, July and August. But just-
released revisions of the index now show that it
rose in August. Thus, there were only two con-
secutive months of decline rather than three.
The second difficulty in interpreting the III is that
the future it may help to predict is somewhat
indefinitely far ahead. Majordownturns in the Ill,
for example, have occurred anywhere from three
to twenty-three months ahead of actual down-
turns. Upturns in the index have started from one
to eight months before the economy bottomed
out. The problems of judging sustained changes
in the index and of the relatively short average
leadtime between turns in the index and turns in
the economy (particularly for troughs) have led
some analysts to argue that the principal value of
the ILI lies in its abilityto identify the current state
of the economy. Since much economic data are
available only after the fact and since they often
are subject to substantial revisions, even being
able to "predict" the present is valuable.
Construction of III
Despite these reservations, the III has the advan-
tage ofdiversification: it is a composite index
made up of many different series. Movements in
economic activity originate from different
sources at different times and the response ofthe
economy to any given stimulus may itself vary
over time. By including a wide range of series
covering many different activities, the composite
index is more likely to detect important changes
in the level of aggregate economic activity,
regardless of the source ofthose movements.
From time to time, the series used to construct the
III have changed. The last major revision took
place in 1975 when a number of series were
specified in real, or constant dollar, terms rather
than in current dollar terms. Since then, new
weights have been assigned to the individual
series in light of past experience, and the defini-
tions of some ofthe series have changed. The
twelve series currently used to construct the
composite index were selected on the basis ofsix
criteria: (1) economic significance, (2) statistical
adequacy, (3) consistency of timing at busil"}ess
cycle peaks and troughs, (4) conformity to the
business cycle generally, (5) smoothness, and (6)
prompt availability of data.
The significance criterion emphasizes series that
represent what are thought to be important
sources of business cycle movements. Statistical
adequacy requires that the available data series
faithfully measure movements in those sources.
The requirement of consistency focuses attention
on series that have reliably turned upward and
downward prior to troughs and peaks in overall
economic activity. Conformity refers to how con-
sistently a series moves with the overall pattern of
activity, not just at business cycle turning points.
The smoothness criterion gives emphasis toseries
whose changes in direction are likely to be
maintained. And the availability criterion ensures
thatthe data for the series are available soon after
the fact.FRBSF
The differentseries reflect developments in many
areas of the economy: in labor markets (new
unemployment insurance claims, average weekly
hours in manufacturing); in financial markets
(common stockprices, real moneysupply, percent
change in private credit); in residential construc-
tion (new building permits); in business activity
(net business formation, real value of contracts
and ordersfor plantand equipment, change in real
inventories on hand and on order, real value of
new orders for consumer goods, percent of com-
panies receiving slower deliveries); and in prices
(percent change in sensitive materials prices).
The recent surge in U.S. imports provides a vivid
example of why a broadly based III generally
provides better signals than anyone of its compo-
nent series. Import penetration has been concen-
trated in goods rather than services. (It's not
difficult for Americans to buy French autos; it is
more difficultto buy French taxi rides, unless one
goes to France.) This has been especially true in
the business equipment industry. About one-
quarteroftotal expenditures bydomestic business
for durables recently has been for foreign items.
Thus, looking at orders alone would suggest
weakness in the U.S. economy.
This, however, is not the case. The strength of
demand from other sources has overwhelmed the
depressing effects on the economy ofthe import
surge. Because the III includes non-orders series
as well as orders series, it accurately reflects this
strength in the economy. (In fact, through its
effects on interest rates and the dollar exchange
rate, the strength ofdemand in these other sectors
has contributed to the surge in imports.)
Inflation and supply shocks
The Ill's component series were selected pri-
marily on the basis of their records over the
1947-70 period. Peacetime business cycles in that
period took place in an environment of low
inflation, and were driven primarily by "shocks"
to aggregate domestic spending as government
and private sector behavior shifted. Since 1970,
the American economy has also been buffeted by
disturbances in aggregate supply and by shocks
originating externally. Moreover, since the late
1960s, the underlying and observed rates of
inflation have been through three cycles: the late
1960s rise that culminated in a fall when price
controls were imposed in 1971; the mid-1970s
rise broughton by OPEC, and the subsequent fall;
and the rise in the late 1970s, again associated
with OPEC, and the dramatic decline since 1980.
These alternating periods of relatively high and
low inflation make interpretation ofthe index as
currently constructed problematic.
The level of common stock prices, percent
changes in sensitive materials prices, and percent
changes in private credit are three series included
in the index that can distort the index as an
indicator of real activity because they are not
adjusted for changes in the overall level of prices.
When variations in the inflation rate are relatively
small, these distortions are relatively unimportant.
But suppose there were a sudden large drop in
inflation from an average rate often percentto five
percent. After the adjustments to this new situa-
tion, materials prices and credit growth rates each
wouId be five percent lowerthan before. Although
these lower growth rates would not indicate
weaker real growth in thedemand fororsupplyof
materialsorcredit,theirinclusion in theIIIwould
tend to depress the level of the index.
Similarly, the Standard and Poor's 500 stock price
index enters the III in units unadjusted for the
higher level of aggregate prices. If stock prices
generally rise one-for-one with the aggregate
price level, the unadjusted stock price index
would rise, other things being equal, at the rate of
inflaton. This will tend unduly to elevate the III
even ifthe real value ofequities is unchanged. In
the post-1980 period, when inflation slowed
dramatically butthe price level continued to rise,
the effects ofthese forces would presumably have
tended to offset each other to an unknown extent.
Even adjusting materials price inflationforgeneral
inflation may not convert it into a reliable signal
when there are shocks to aggregate supply as well
astoaggregatedemand.lftherewereonlydemand
shocks, the inflation-adjusted, or relative, price of
materials may bear a consistent relation to aggre-
gate economicactivity. For example, ifsuch prices
rose quicklyand generally in advanceofincreases
in aggregate demand and output, they would put
upward pressure on the IL1. However, ifthere were
a disturbance that reduced the supply of raw
materials, the relative price ofthis supply would
also rise, but tend to be associated with lower
economicactivity. In this case, theIII again would
show an increase even though economic activity
would have weakened. This is what happened
both in the middleand late 1970swhen theworldprice of oil skyrocketed. The possibility of simul-
taneous supply and demand shocks makes it
difficult to interpret what movements in this
component imply about the future state ofthe
economy without supplementary information on
the source of such movements.




Thus, the alternative index suggests that the offi-
cial index may not be issuing a sufficiently opti-
mistic signal about the upcoming condition ofthe
economy. As long as the inflation rate declines,
the divergence between the two measures will
increase. Over periods as brief as a couple of
months, these two indexes are likely to behave
similarly because the majorityoftheir component
series are specified in real terms, that is to say,
abstracting of inflation. Only sizeable changes in
the prevailing inflation rate, which usually take a
numberofmonthstooccur, wiII lead tonoticeable
differences. But even without modifications for
the effects ofchanging inflation rates, the index of
leading economic indicators still provides valu-







reattained its peak level by January, while the
official index remained somewhat below its peak.
The alternative index rises three percent more
than the official index over this short period, and
although both measures reached their highest
levels last May, the alternative index had virtually
An alternative index
The chart plots the official III and an alternative
thatmakes a rough attempt to compensate for the
factthatthe rates ofchange in materials prices and
in private credit in the index are not adjusted for
inflation. As explained earlier, a decline in the
economy-widerateofinflation-suchasoccurred
in 1983-84-would show up as a fall in the Ill,
even though economic activity might be un-
affected. To remove this anomaly, the new series
adjusts the index upward to offset the decline
caused by falling inflation. In other words, it is
whatthe indexwould be ifthe core, orunderlying,
inflationary rate had not changed. Since the
underlying inflation rate fell an average of 0.1
percent each month in the period 1983-1984, the
adjustment consists of adding successive incre-
ments of 0.1 percent each month to the rates of
growth of materials prices and credit over the
period, and then re-computing the III on the basis
ofthese new series. Since the actual inflation rate
has fallen even furtherthan the core rate, using the
actual rate to adjust the index would provide an
even bigger boost to the alternative index. De-
flating the level ofstock prices, on the other hand,
would move the alternative index closer to the
official index.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 188,847 110 12,700 7.2
Loans and Leases 1 6 171,109 120 15,072 9.6
Commercial and Industrial 52,880 - 9 5,775 12.2
Real estate 62,269 38 2,455 8.2
Loans to Individuals 32,889 87 5,799 21.4
Leases 5,328 43 322 6.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,662 - 37 - 1,543 - 12.6
Other Securities2 7,075 26 - 825 - 10.4
Total Deposits 193,357 - 910 7,559 4.1
Demand Deposits 44,096 - 768 575 1.3
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,772 - 79 478 1.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,265 - 313 980 7.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,000 172 6,004 4.6
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 49,952 57 3,457 8.5
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 38,979 70 901 2.3
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 19,767 1,059 919 4.8
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading acc:ount securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change